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Abstract
In September 2019, voters for the election at the Parliament of the city of
Moscow will be allowed to use an internet voting system. The source code of it
has been made available for public testing. The encryption used in this system is
a variant of ElGamal with key sizes that are too small. We explain how to retrieve
the private keys from the public keys in a matter of minutes with easily available
resources.
1 Context
Disclaimer: most of the context information here relies on secondary sources or auto-
matic translation of texts written in Russian. There is a possibility of misunderstanding
by the author.
In September 2019 (one month in the future, at the date of the writing of this note),
there will be elections in Moscow for the representatives at the Parliament of the city
(the Moscow City Douma). During this election, up to half a million of voters will
be allowed to use internet voting. The voting system that will be used has been the
subject of a public test at the end of July, during which some of the source code was
made public on Github [1].
Although we did not find (yet?) a public specification of the protocol in English, we
understand that it uses the Ethereum blockchain, with its smart contract capabilities.
During the public test, the public code was updated every day, proposing new
public keys and new encrypted data, and revealing the private keys and the original
data of the day before. According to the README.md file, the goal was to decrypt
the data in less than 12 hours, since this will be the duration of the election to be held
in September.
2 Result
We will show in this note that the encryption scheme used in this part of the code is
completely insecure. It can be broken in about 20 minutes using a standard personal
computer, and using only free software that is publicly available. More precisely, it is
possible to compute the private keys from the public keys. Once these are known, any
encrypted data can be decrypted as quickly as they are created.
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Without having read the protocol, it is hard to tell precisely the consequences,
because, although we believe that this weak encryption scheme is used to encrypt the
ballots, it is unclear how easy it is for an attacker to have the correspondence between
the ballots and the voters. In the worst case scenario, the votes of all the voters using
this system would be revealed to anyone as soon as they cast their vote.
After we contacted the people in charge in Russia before making this note public,
they made a reply1 on Iuliia Krivonosova’s blog. They acknowledge that the keys
are too small and they plan to upgrade to 1024 bits. They didn’t provide a proper
specification of the system yet.
3 The encryption scheme
We describe here what we have understood from the directory smart-contracts/
packages/crypto-lib/src/ of the public code [1].
The encryption is based on the ElGamal scheme. For a cyclic group G of generator
g, given a public key h and a message m, the scheme produces a pair Encg,h(m) = [a, b].
And knowing the secret key x (i.e. the discrete logarithm of h relative to g), it is possible
to decrypt: Decg,x(a, b) = m. The description in Wikipedia
2 is what is implemented, so
we refer to it for further details. Let us just mention that if one part of the ciphertext
(a or b) is missing, then even knowing the secret key, there is no way to decrypt and
get the original message.
In the Moscow system, things are a bit more complicated, because a variant using
3 levels of encryption is implemented. Let G1, G2, G3, be three cyclic groups of
generators g1, g2, g3. There are three public keys h1, h2, h3, one for each group. In
order to encrypt a message m, they first compute the following:
• [a1, b1] := Encg1,h1(m)
• [a2, b2] := Encg2,h2(a1)
• [a3, b3] := Encg3,h3(a2)
and then the ciphertext is the quadruple [b1, b2, a3, b3]. The values a1 and a2 are
forgotten, but someone knowing the private keys x1, x2, x3 corresponding to h1, h2,
h3, will be able to deduce m as follows:
• a2 := Decg3,x3(a3, b3)
• a1 := Decg2,x2(a2, b2)
• m := Decg1,x1(a1, b1)
The purpose of this multi-level encryption is not known to us. It can not be security,
because this will be only marginally more secure that using only the group which is
the most secure.
The main problem is due to the choice ofG1, G2, G3. In [1], in the encryption-keys/
keys subdirectory, there is a file called public-key.json that contains a description of
them. They are multiplicative groups of finite fields of prime orders p1, p2, p3, each of
them being Sophie Germain primes. There is nothing wrong with this apart from the
1https://medium.com/p/9382db4da71f/responses/show
2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ElGamal_encryption
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sizes of p1, p2, p3, which are all less than 256-bit long. This is way, way too short to
guarantee any security.
We will see below that discrete logarithms in such a small setting can be computed
in a matter of minutes, thus revealing the secret keys, and then all the encrypted data
becomes easy to decrypt.
Before going to this, we mention quickly another mistake in the design that could
in itself have led to devastating attacks. The generators that are given in public-
key.json are generators of the whole multiplicative group. However, due to the Chinese
remainder theorem, it is a good practice to use a generator of prime order. In the
present case, the generators will have their order divisible by 2, and therefore there is a
huge risk that one bit of information leaks from a ciphertext. In a context like e-voting
where a ballot can have a very simple form, this bit of information could reveal a lot
of the vote (or even all of it in the case of a yes/no question). In principle, we would
have had to investigate more in this direction. But due to the main attack that is much
easier and far more powerful, we keep this as a remark.
4 Computing discrete logarithms
We now explain the state of the art of computing discrete logarithms in finite fields.
The best known algorithm for this task is the Number Field Sieve that was invented
in the early 90’s [2]. It is a complicated algorithm that uses heavy notions of number
theory. Also, it is not suitable for computing discrete logarithms in very small finite
fields, for which better algorithms are known. However, when the prime p has more
than a few dozens of digits, like the primes we are interested in, it becomes clearly the
best.
For our attack, we used CADO-NFS [3] which is a free software implementation of
the Number Field Sieve, the author of this note being one of the major developers of
this piece of software. The last official release is rather old, so we used the development
version, that is available from the public git repository.
CADO-NFS takes as input p and h and computes the discrete logarithm of h in
GF (p) relative to an arbitrary generator. In order to get the discrete logarithm of h
relative to the given generator g, one has to run CADO-NFS again to get the logarithm
of g, so that we can divide those two values (this is similar to what we do to compute
the log in base 2 of a number when the pocket calculator provides only the log in
base e). Hence, if logcado(h) and logcado(g) are the values returned by CADO-NFS as
discrete logarithms of h and g respectively, then the discrete logarithm of h relative to
g is just
logg(h) =
logcado(h)
logcado(g)
.
Fortunately, many parts of the computation can be shared between the two execu-
tions of CADO-NFS modulo the same p, and the software does indeed share them
automatically.
Another complication is due to the fact that CADO-NFS assumes that we are in
the prime order setting (as explained above, this should be what people do!), while here
the order is twice a prime. This means that we have some additional easy operations
to do in order to deduce the private keys corresponding to what is expected in the
Moscow system. In more details, if we denote the order of the generator g by 2ℓ, where
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ℓ = (p − 1)/2 is a prime, then CADO-NFS gives only the result modulo ℓ, while we
need it modulo 2ℓ. Thanks to the Chinese remainder theorem, there are only two
possibilities left for the private key, and it is easy to check which one corresponds to
the public key.
All of these operations to be done in order to get the private key once CADO-NFS
has outputted the two results are elementary number theory (just modular arithmetic)
and take no time. This is included in the shell script given in Appendix, for repro-
ducibility.
Once all the required software is downloaded and compiled, we measured the time
to compute each of the 3 private keys, corresponding to the last public keys published
in the repo [1] on August 1st. The computation was done on a personal computer
equipped with a 4-core Intel i5-4590 processor at 3.3 GHz and 16 GB of RAM. It is
running a standard Debian distribution.
The running times to retrieve the private keys are as follows:
key number time
1 425 sec
2 507 sec
3 314 sec
Note that the variation in the running time from one key to the other is not unusual
for computations with moderately small primes.
Of course, for a real attack, the three private keys can be computed simultaneously
on 3 machines in parallel. Indeed, the chaining involved in the multi-level ElGamal is
not relevant for the keys, it occurs only during the encryption / decryption of messages.
Additionally to this immediate 3-fold parallelism for the attack, CADO-NFS also
has some parallelism capabilities so that machines with more cores can reduce the time
for a single key. However, there is some limit to it with the current implementation.
For instance, the private key number 1 could be retrieved in 160 seconds on a machine
with 64 cores.
5 Breaking the scheme
Now that we have everything in place, the scenario of the attack is the following. Before
the day of elections, machines are prepared with all the required software downloaded,
compiled and tested. As soon as the election opens, the public keys must be available,
so that voters can encrypt their ballot. Then with the strategy we have just described
and explicitly applied in the shell script given in Appendix, the attacker can retrieve
all the private keys in less than 10 minutes using 3 standard personal computers, or
even less if they have access to a more powerful machine. They can then decrypt all
the data that is supposed to be secured by this encryption. In particular, if the ballots
are protected with this, they must be considered as being in cleartext as soon as they
are cast.
6 Remaining questions
• Why such small keys?
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A possible explanation is a confusion with the key size that can be used when
using elliptic curves for which the Number Field Sieve algorithm does not apply.
Another less excusable but still possible explanation might be related to the use of
the Ethereum blockchain. In the Solidity programming language that is used to
write smart contracts, the bit size of the largest supported integers is 256. Maybe
the authors did not want to write a multiprecision arithmetic library that would
have been required to deal with larger key sizes. This hypothesis is supported by
frequent tests in the source code, checking that the big integers they manipulate
are not bigger than SOLIDITY_MAX_INT.
• Where does the multi-level ElGamal comes from?
This is a mystery. The only possible explanation we can think of is that the
designers thought this would compensate for the too small key sizes of the primes
involved. But 3 primes of 256 bits are really not the same as one prime of 768
bits.
• Are the ballots really encrypted with this scheme?
From the source code, in particular in the subdirectory named smart-contracts/
packages/voting-lib/src/contracts, our guess is that yes. However, reading
a proper specification of the voting scheme would be the only way to know.
• Is there an easy fix?
In principle, yes: increase the key size. The current general recommendation is at
least 2048 bits. However, if the hypothesis that writing a multiprecision library
for Solidity is a problem appears to be correct, there is no easy workaround.
Using elliptic curves is probably a good idea, but again this is not a change that
can be done in just a few hours of coding.
Maybe there is an easier fix by changing the protocol, so that the smart contracts
do not compute anything with the encrypted ballots.
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8 Appendix: a shell script for the attack
## These are commands to be run on a Linux machine (Debian or Ubuntu).
## The main workhorse for the discrete logarithm computations is CADO-NFS,
## and we use GP-Pari as a ’pocket calculator’ for modular arithmetic.
# install some packages
sudo apt install pari-gp jq
sudo apt install libgmp3-dev gcc g++ cmake libhwloc-dev
alias gpnoc="gp -q --default colors=\"no\""
# download and compile cado-nfs
cd /tmp
git clone https://scm.gforge.inria.fr/anonscm/git/cado-nfs/cado-nfs.git
cd cado-nfs
git checkout fdae0f9f382c # most recent version at the time of writing
make cmake
make -j 4
# download blockchain-voting and extract public keys
cd /tmp
git clone https://github.com/moscow-technologies/blockchain-voting.git
cd blockchain-voting
git checkout d70986b2c4da # most recent version at the time of writing
cd /tmp
# loop on the 3 public keys; could be done in parallel on 3 machines.
for i in {0,1,2}; do
start=‘date +%s‘
# extract the public key information
p=‘jq .modulos[$i] /tmp/blockchain-voting/encryption-keys/keys/public-key.json | tr -d \"‘
g=‘jq .generators[$i] /tmp/blockchain-voting/encryption-keys/keys/public-key.json | tr -d \"‘
h=‘jq .publicKeys[$i] /tmp/blockchain-voting/encryption-keys/keys/public-key.json | tr -d \"‘
ell=‘echo "($p-1)/2" | gpnoc‘
# run cado-nfs to get log of h (takes a few minutes)
wdir=‘mktemp -d /tmp/cadorunXXXXXX‘
log_h=‘/tmp/cado-nfs/cado-nfs.py -dlp -ell $ell workdir=$wdir target=$h $p‘
# run again to get log of generator (faster, since it reuses precomputed data)
log_g=‘/tmp/cado-nfs/cado-nfs.py $wdir/p75.parameters_snapshot.0 target=$g‘
# deduce private key
x=‘gpnoc <<EOF
xell=lift(Mod($log_h,$ell)/Mod($log_g,$ell)); half=lift(1/Mod(2,$ell));
x0=lift(Mod(2*half*xell, 2*$ell)); h0=lift(Mod($g,$p)^x0);
if (h0 != $h, x0=lift(Mod(2*half*xell+$ell, 2*$ell)));
x0
EOF‘
stop=‘date +%s‘
echo "Private key number $((i+1)) is $x, computed in $((stop-start)) seconds."
done
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